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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the Tunisian Constituent Assembly voted on the provisions 
of its new post-revolution constitution, international media 
reports—noting that the new constitution contains no express 
reference to Islamic law—ebulliently declared that Tunisia had 
rejected Islamic law and embraced secular civil law.1 Shortly 
thereafter, on the same day the rhapsodic headlines were printed, 
the deliberation on the Tunisian constitution was suspended “after 
a deputy claimed he had received death threats because a colleague 
had accused him of being an ‘enemy of Islam.’”2 The issue of 
whether or not the Tunisian constitution would reference Islamic 
law had, throughout the preceding year, been the focus of intense 
and acrimonious debate within Tunisia and among international 
actors with an interest in Tunisia’s post-revolution transition to 
 1. See RT, Tunisia opts for civil, not Sharia law as assembly votes on new 
constitution (Jan 5, 2014), http://rt.com/news/tunisia-rejects-islam-law-196/; see 
also AAP, Tunisia's assembly has rejected Islam as the main source of law as it 
voted on a new constitution (January 5, 2014): “Tunisia's Islamist-dominated 
constituent assembly has compromised in rejecting Islam as the main source of 
law as it voted on a new constitution for the country that spawned the Arab 
spring.http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2014/01/05/tunisia-mps-reject-islam-
law” 
 2. See Tunisia MPs reject Islam as law, supra note 1. 
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democracy.3 Therefore, when the new constitution omitted 
mention of Islamic law, it was viewed in certain circles as a 
triumph of progressive liberalism and, in others, a defeat of Islamic 
legal principles.4 This article, in analyzing the domestic civil law 
in force in Tunisia, posits that, with regard to Tunisian civil law, 
neither conclusion is entirely true.5 To the contrary, for well over a 
century, Tunisian civil law, a “mixed” civil law system which 
incorporates elements of continental civil law derived from 
European codes with Islamic law and Tunisian custom, has 
regulated the ordinary affairs of Tunisians in a manner that is 
consistent with both modern legal norms and the tenets of Islamic 
law.6  
Illuminating this hybridity in Tunisian civil law is useful on a 
number of levels. From an academic perspective, in the context of 
Middle Eastern and North African civil law systems, recent 
scholarship (quite rightly) has focused on the work of Abd al-
Razzaq Al-Sanhūrī, among the most accomplished comparative 
lawyers of the twentieth century7 and the chief architect of many 
civil codes for countries in the Middle East and North Africa who 
 3. Aziz El Yaakoubi, Death threats disrupt Tunisia constitution debate, 
Reuters, Jan 5, 2014: “Since the 2011 uprising, tensions over the role of Islam in 
Tunisia and the assassination of two secular politicians by hardline Islamist 
militants last year have widened divisions between Islamists and secular 
parties.” 
 4. Id. 
 5. For an interesting discussion regarding the relevancy of such a clause, 
known as a repugnancy clause, see Haider Ala Hamoudi, Repugnancy in the 
Arab World, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 427, 427 (2012). 
 6. There are numerous schools of Islamic law (or madhabs). Although the 
Maliki madhab prevails in Tunisia, see HALIM RANE, ISLAM AND 
CONTEMPORARY CIVILISATION 83 (2010), the Hanifi madhab is also very 
significant. Other minority madhabs, such as the Ibāḍī madhab, can also be 
found in Tunisia. See, generally, J.H. van Riel, The Ibāḍī Traders of Bilād al-
Sūdān (Master’s thesis, The American University in Cairo, School of 
Humanities and Social Sciences, 2012). As this article will demonstrate, in those 
areas where it draws on Islamic law, the Tunisian Code of Obligations and 
Contracts draws most significantly from the Maliki and Hanafi madhabs. 
 7. See Amr Shalakany, Sanhuri and the Historical Origins of Comparative 
Law in the Arab World (or How Sometimes Losing Your Asalah can be Good for 
You) in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 152 (2001). 
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were achieving independence in the aftermath of World War I.8 
Sanhūrī’s work is notable for its masterful synthesis of European 
and Islamic legal principles and has come to serve as the archetype 
for Middle Eastern civil codes.9 The Tunisian civil code, however, 
is an interesting example of North African legislation which 
predates Sanhūrī and which also seeks to reconcile Islamic law 
with continental civil law based on European codifications10—and 
a model which has influenced subsequent codifications in North 
Africa and the Sahel, specifically in Morocco and Mauritania.11 
The Tunisian legal experience, therefore, represents the genesis of 
a unique version of Middle Eastern and North African legal 
codification. 
In addition, an understanding of Tunisian civil law can inform 
analysis of the current political situation in Tunisia as many of the 
ongoing post-revolution debates have revolved around the role of 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. It is worth noting that continental civil law has always demonstrated 
a unique capacity to be exported and assimilated into other legal milieus. Since 
the advent of the modern civil code, civil law jurists (and comparativists) in 
various places throughout the world have acted as “synthesists,” working to 
create a civil code based on the French model but retaining a sufficient degree of 
organic legal substance so as to be faithful to the legal traditions of the 
jurisdiction. These “synthesists” include the Haitian-born Louisiana jurist, Louis 
Casimir Elisabeth Moreau-Lislet, who, as early as 1806, along with another 
jurist named James Brown, was charged with creating a civil code for what was 
then called “the Territory of Orleans.” See ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, LOUIS 
CASIMIR ELISABETH MOREAU LISLET, FATER OF LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 80 
(1996). As Professor Alain Levasseur demonstrates in his illuminative book on 
the topic, Moreau-Lislet was given the task of creating a civil code based on the 
laws in force in Louisiana at that time, the substance of which was Spanish in 
origin. He was charged with this duty almost contemporaneously with the 
promulgation of the Code Napoléon. Id. at 64. To accomplish this task, Moreau-
Lislet was perhaps the first civil law jurist to synthesize the French civil code 
with non-French law (the Spanish law that was at that time in force). In this 
effort, “[a]nterior laws were repealed, so far only as they were contrary to or 
irreconcilable with any of the provisions of the new.” Id. at 65. Such a method is 
akin to the method used in crafting Tunisian civil law. 
 10. See Mohamed Kamel Charfeggine, Présentation in LIVRE DU 
CENTENAIRE DU CODE DES OBLIGATIONS ET DES CONTRATS 1906-2006 
(Mohamed Kamel Charfeggine ed., 2006). 
 11. See Id. 
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Islamic law in Tunisian society.12 Understanding how Tunisian 
civil law accommodates Islamic law can render the analysis of 
such debates more meaningful by revealing the degree to which 
constitutional references to Islamic law actually influence the 
presence or absence of Islamic legal influence in contemporary 
Tunisian legislation. A review of that legislation and its history 
presents a far richer and more nuanced view of Tunisian law and 
its sources and, importantly, gives reason for Tunisians of all 
political and ideological stripes to find a measure of accord and 
acceptance of their civil laws and their legal and philosophical 
lineage.  
II. TUNISIAN LAW AND ITS STRATEGIC CONTEXT 
The past decade or so has witnessed a marked increase in the 
attention paid to legal systems in the Middle East and North 
Africa.13 Wars, revolutions, and the increasingly expeditionary 
foreign policies of western governments in the 21st century (which 
viewed foreign instability as a threat to domestic national security) 
have drawn the study of these legal systems into the foreign policy 
calculus of major countries seeking to promote stability or 
otherwise assert influence in the region.14 Most recently, the 
challenges faced by countries in the region in the aftermath of the 
 12. See Library of Congress, The Role of Islamic Law in Tunisia’s 
Constitution and Legislation Post-Arab Spring (Jan 31, 2014), 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/tunisia.php. 
 13. See CHIBLI MALLAT, IRAQ: GUIDE TO LAW AND POLICY XXI (2009):“A 
search in American and British law journals yielded 250 entries for articles and 
notes on Iraq since 2003. There was hardly a tenth that number over the 
previous 50 years.” See also University of London SOAS, 
http://www.soas.ac.uk/cimel/: “The Centre of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 
was established in 1990 at the School of Oriental and African Studies in 
recognition of the growing importance of law in both its Islamic and Middle 
Eastern dimensions.” 
 14. For a discussion of the link between comparative law and stability 
operations carried out by U.S. armed forces, see Dan E. Stigall, Comparative 
Law and Stability Operations: A Basic Overview and a Few Thoughts on 
Lésion, Comparativelawblog (21 May, 2010), available at 
http://comparativelawblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/comparative-law-and-
stability.html. 
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Arab Spring are beginning to draw attention to the legal systems of 
North Africa and the Levant.15 This is, in part, because the 
deleterious effect of that series of revolutions on the domestic 
institutions of affected countries has made those countries more 
prone to “destabilizing ethnic and sectarian rivalries”16 and “have 
created opportunities for extremist groups to find ungoverned 
space from which to destabilize the new governments and prepare 
attacks against Western interests inside those countries.”17 A major 
issue of concern for these various regions is the way in which law 
and legal institutions can effectively address the needs of 
heterogeneous and pluralistic societies which must co-exist in the 
context of a unified legal and national framework.18 This is 
especially true in those countries which are currently crafting new 
constitutions, writing new legislation, and wrestling with the 
complex issues associated with the proper role of religion and 
religious law.19 But such legal harmonization is a challenge at 
 15. See Islamic Law in Transitioning Arab Spring Countries Subject of June 
4 Program, http://www.loc.gov/today/pr/2013/13-091.html (noting that the Law 
Library of Congress and the Library’s African and Middle Eastern Division 
hosted a panel discussion on the role and impact of Islamic law in the 
developing constitutions and laws of transitioning countries in the Middle 
East/North Africa region in 2013.). 
 16. See Woodrow Wilson Center, U.S. Intelligence: Arab Spring Generated 
Threats (March 15, 2013), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/islamists/article/us-
intelligence-arab-spring-generated-threats.  
 17. Id.  
 18. See Lally Weymouth, The Arab Spring’s Last Hope: An interview with 
Rachid Ghannouchi, the leader of Tunisia’s largest political party, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2013/12/rachid_gha
nnouchi_interview_the_tunisian_leader_of_the_ennahda_party_on.html 
(quoting Rachid Ghannouchi as saying: “I believe that Tunisia will be successful 
in presenting a successful democratic model because we have a homogenous 
society, with a small Jewish minority.”) See also Euro-Mediterranean Network 
for Human Rights, The Reform of Judiciaries in the Wake of the Arab Spring, 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/515009ac2.pdf (“The ‘Arab Spring’ is not only 
‘Arab’. Due regard should be given to the role and contribution of the different 
ethnic and linguistic minorities in the region, such as Amazigh, Kurds, and 
many others who equally participated in the democratic uprising.”). 
 19. See Clark Lombardi, Fierce Contest: Constitutional Islam and the Arab 
Spring, World Politics Review, 08 October, 2013, 
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13280/fierce-contest-
constitutional-islam-and-the-arab-spring: “The struggle between liberals and 
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every level. As Professor Mireille Delmas-Marty notes: “Ordering 
multiplicity without reducing it to sameness, admitting pluralism 
without giving up on building common law with a common 
measure for fair and unfair, can therefore seem an unattainable 
goal.”20  
Developments in Tunisia are of particular interest due to the 
fact that Tunisia, more than any other country in the region, is 
emerging as a model for Arab Spring countries seeking a 
successful transition to democracy. Tunisia, after all, was the 
genesis and the epicenter of the Arab Spring (which began as the 
“Jasmine Revolution”).21 While outcomes throughout the region 
have varied, in the aftermath of those tremorous spasms of discord 
and political upheaval, commentators have noted Tunisia’s 
relatively successful transition from autocracy.22 This success is 
due, in no small part, to the fact that Tunisia experienced a regime 
change but retained its vital state institutions23 and has, throughout 
its process of transition, maintained relative (though imperfect) 
stability whereas neighboring countries have not.24 As a result, 
Tunisia’s very real potential for success has redefined it on the 
conservative Islamists often intensifies when constitutions are being drafted or 
amended. The Arab Spring has thus ushered in an era of fierce contest.”  
 20. See MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, ORDERING PLURALISM: A CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL WORLD 1 
(2009). 
 21. See Tunisia and Democratic Transition, Global Brief (March 9, 2011). 
 22. See Judy Woodruff, Tunisia, birthplace of the Arab Spring, struggles to 
reset its democracy, PBS, November 23, 2013, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/july-dec13/tunisia_11-25.html. 
 23. See QUERINE HANLON, THE PROSPECTS FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 
IN TUNISIA: A YEAR AFTER THE REVOLUTION 5 (U.S. Army War College, 
Strategic Studies Institute, September 2012). 
 24. See Aziz El Yaakoubi, Tunisia starts voting on new constitution, 
Reuters, Fri Jan 3, 2014: “[Tunisia's] final steps to full democracy have been 
widely watched as a possible model in a region where Egypt, Libya and Yemen, 
which also ousted their leaders in 2011, are struggling with violence and 
instability as well as resurgent Islamism.” 
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world stage as a regional anchor, a lodestar for countries in 
transition, and “the Arab Spring’s last hope.”25  
Central to Tunisia’s transition from autocracy to democracy is 
the question of what law will apply and the sources from which 
that law is to be derived.26 The major focus of analysis and debate 
in this regard has been on Tunisia’s new constitution,27 which, 
after intense national debate, was formulated without reference to 
Islamic law as a source of law.28 Very little attention, however, has 
been paid to the domestic civil law in force in Tunisia and the 
sources of that law, the analysis of which demonstrates that Islamic 
law remains part of Tunisian civil law.29 While the retention of 
Islamic law in the Tunisian legal corpus is most evident in its 
Personal Status Code, which is based on a progressive 
interpretation of Islamic law and Tunisian custom,30 Islamic law is 
 25. See Weymouth, supra note 18. 
 26. See Asma Ghribi, Role of Islamic Law in Tunisian Constitution 
Provokes Debate, Tunisialive, 22 March 2012, 
www.tunisia-live.net/2012/03/22/role-of-islamic-law-in-tunisian-constitution-
provokes-debate/#sthash.mgLeAjgP.dpuf.  
 27. See Aziz El Yaakoubi, supra note 24. 
 28. Heba Saleh, Tunisia finalises new constitution, FT.com, January 24, 
2014,http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b029551a-8498-11e3-b72e- 
00144feab7de.html#axzz3FDLndjuM: “The document says that Islam is the 
religion of the Tunisian state, but makes no mention at all of Islamic sharia law.” 
 29. See Lombardi, supra note 19:  
The [Ennahda] party thus supported the adoption of a constitution that 
did not explicitly require the constitution to respect Islam—preferring 
to ensure that the constitution left room for Islamists to take power and 
impose laws that reflected their understanding of Islam. Ennahda 
appears, in fact, to favor a fairly liberal understanding of Islam, but one 
could imagine a more conservative group taking a similar path. 
 See also Thousands rally demanding sharia law in Tunisia, AFP, Mar 16, 2012. 
 30. See Jane Adas, Tunisia’s Personal Status Code and Modernity 
(Development and Human Rights, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 
March 2007), at 42-43 (noting that “[e]lements of the code were promulgated in 
a 1939 draft based on Islamic canon law under the Ottoman Bey, when Tunisia 
was still under French control,” and that:  
Mohamed Habib Cherif, minister of justice and human rights, observed 
that the Personal Status Code is deeply anchored in Tunisian society, 
where women have been an important presence since Queen Dido 
founded Carthage. The godfather of the Personal Status Code was 
Tunisian reformist scholar Tahar Haddad, who in 1930 published Our 
Women in Religion and Society. Elements of the code were 
promulgated in a 1939 draft based on Islamic canon law under the 
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also firmly entrenched in the ordinary civil law which regulates the 
daily transactions of Tunisian citizens. Importantly, however, an 
analysis of Tunisian civil law also demonstrates that the presence 
of Islamic legal influence in Tunisian civil law has not been a 
negative aspect or a harmful element, nor has Islamic law’s 
presence in Tunisian civil law over the past century served to 
significantly alter the physiognomy of Tunisian society into 
something unrecognizable to Western secular sensibilities. To the 
contrary, the Tunisian code demonstrates how Islamic law can 
function in a modern context alongside continental civil law as part 
of a mixed jurisdiction in which domestic civil law is derived from 
a multiplicity of sources.31  
This article, therefore, provides a focused analysis on Tunisian 
civil law and its role in post-revolution Tunisia, specifically 
focusing on the Tunisian Code of Obligations and Contracts, 
which, since its promulgation in 1906, has been described as “the 
first durable codification of Tunisian civil law.”32 Through an 
analysis of the history, sources, and operation of Tunisian civil 
Ottoman Bey, when Tunisia was still under French control. The 1956 
Code, Cherif said, erased discriminatory traditions, such as customary 
marriage and secret divorce, and reformed the judiciary by replacing 
the Islamic, Christian and Jewish courts with a uniform, secular 
system.). 
 31. See Seán Patrick Donlan, The Mediterranean Hybridity Project: 
Crossing the Boundaries of Law and Culture, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 355 (2011) 
(describing “mixed legal systems” as “diverse state laws [that] emerge from 
different legal traditions, . . .”) Id. at 359-60, and noting that:  
Neither the hybridity nor the diffusion of laws is new. Within Europe, 
law predated the state and the creation of genuinely national laws; a 
legal “system” centered on the modern nation-state, and the elimination 
of competing jurisdictions and marginalization of non-legal norms was 
a very long historical process. Especially before the 19th century, there 
were multiple contemporaneous legal orders co-existing in the same 
geographical space and at the same time. Modern national traditions are 
unique hybrids rooted in diverse customary or folklaws, summary and 
discretionary jurisdictions, local and particular iura propria, the 
Romano-canonical “learned laws” or ius commune, and other trans-
territorial iura communia (including feudal law and the lex mercatoria). 
Id. at 356. 
 32. See Kamel Charfeggine, supra note 10. 
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law, the article demonstrates that this body of law is remarkably 
well-suited to the task of accommodating a diverse society, parts of 
which might insist on or desire the application of certain Islamic 
legal norms.33 Moreover, it is a historically important document as 
it is also an early example of legal fusion—“une tentative de 
conciliation unique en son genre entre droits civils de pays 
européens et droit civil musulman.”34  
A. Tunisian Legal History: A Brief Overview 
Before delving too deeply into Tunisian legislation, it is worth 
noting some key aspects of Tunisia’s legal history which have 
served to shape and continuously influence the country’s legal 
physiognomy. The geographic territory that we associate today 
with the modern country of Tunisia35 is one with a rich history of 
diverse people and successive empires, all of which influence 
modern Tunisia’s fascinating legal culture. The Punic Wars 
brought Tunisia under the Roman Empire in 149 BC.36 Tunisia’s 
subsequent “integration into the Roman and Byzantine Empires led 
to the Christianization of the region in the first several centuries 
CE.”37 Arab Muslim armies, however, “conquered Tunisia in the 
 33. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Death of Islamic Law, 38 GA. J. INT'L & 
COMP. L. 293, 295 (2009-2010): “That the Muslim world is replete with political 
institutions and leaders (described herein, in their multitudinous varieties and 
approaches, as ‘Islamist’) who seek a greater role than this for the shari’a in the 
affairs of the state is obvious to anyone even faintly familiar with the region.” 
 34. See Faouzi Belknani, Code des obligations et des contrats et la 
codification in LIVRE DU CENTENAIRE DU CODE DES OBLIGATIONS ET DES 
CONTRATS 1906-2006 at 17 (Mohamed Kamel Charfeggine ed., 2006). 
 35. Although this article, for the sake of clarity, consistently refers to 
“Tunisia,” it is important to keep in mind Professor Lisa Anderson’s admonition 
that “it is an anachronism to refer . . . to “Tunisia” and “Libya” when discussing 
the 19th century. Until they were occupied by the Europeans, these countries 
were known by the names of their capital cities, Tunis and Tripoli.” LISA 
ANDERSON, THE STATE AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN TUNISIA AND LIBYA, 
1830-1980 at 13 (1986). 
 36. See The Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, 
Tunisia: From the Roman Empire to Ottoman Rule, 
http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/tunisia-from-the-roman-empire-to-
ottoman-rule.  
 37. Id. 
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late seventh century and initiated the spread of Islamic influences 
throughout the country.”38 Coextensive with that series of rulers, 
Roman law prevailed in the early history of the territory known 
today as Tunisia, until the Arab conquest in the 7th Century AD 
effectively replaced Roman law with Islamic law.39 During that 
latter period, among the predominantly Muslim population, the 
Maliki school of Islamic law became most prominent during the 
Aghlabite dynasty, though a notable minority of adherents to the 
Hanafite school also existed in the region.40 Islamic law, however, 
applied only to Muslims during this period. The Jewish population 
was still governed by Mosaic law and Christians by ecclesiastic 
law (which retained elements of Roman law).41 Professor Faouzi 
Belknani, a legal scholar who has served on faculties in both 
Tunisia and Qatar, notes that, in the 12th century, Muslim jurists 
compiled collections fatwas and juridical opinions on diverse 
questions of law,42 such as the Hanafite compilations of Alhindia 
and Alamkîrya or the Malikite collection called Al-Mi’yâr by the 
jurist al-Wanshârisi.43  
The modern administration of Tunisia began in the 19th 
Century,44 which saw the creation of multiple distinct jurisdictions 
and courts, the applicability of which depended on the religion of 
the party. For instance, Muslims had access to Malikite or Hanifite 
courts, while Jews had access to rabbinical courts, etc.45 As a 
general matter, however, commentators note that, before 1885, 
civil law in Tunisia was largely regulated by Islamic law.46 It was 
also during the 19th century that efforts to codify Tunisian law 
began. The Civil and Penal Code promulgated in 1861 by Sadek 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Afif Gaigi, Tunisia in YEARBOOK OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE 
EASTERN LAW 417 (1994). 
 40. Id. at 417-18. 
 41. Id. at 418. 
 42. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 12. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Id. at 14 n.44. 
 45. See Afif Gaigi, supra note 39, at 418. 
 46. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 14. 
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Bey contained provisions inspired by Maliki and Hanafi schools of 
Islamic law,47 but was short lived and was repealed by 1864.48 In 
1885, the promulgation of the Tunisian Code foncier marked the 
beginning of a process of progressive diminution of Islamic law’s 
applicability in Tunisia.49 The momentum toward codification had 
begun and would only garner force. 
It is also worth noting that, in 1876, as the global movement 
toward codification began, perhaps the most significant early 
attempt at codification of Islamic law came with the promulgation 
of the Ottoman code known as the Mejelle.50 That compilation 
would, however, have no immediate influence on the development 
of Tunisian law and was never fully in force in the region today 
associated with modern Tunisia—a region which, as noted, was 
deeply immersed in its own legislative initiatives by the time the 
Mejelle was promulgated.51 In that regard, commentators note that 
the Ottoman legal reforms of the late 19th century occurred 
parallel to Tunisian legal developments, but did not have 
significant impacts in Tunisia, which “retained substantial 
autonomy under the rule of the Husaynid Bey. . . .”52 Nonetheless, 
as discussed further below, the Mejelle would come to influence 
modern Tunisian civil law in later years.  
In 1881, with the Treaty of Bardo, Tunisia’s period as a French 
protectorate began. During this time, the Bey maintained power in 
theory, but was effectively under the power of a foreign (French) 
sovereign.53 French legal influence became more pronounced in 
 47. See Afif Gaigi, supra note 39, at 418. 
 48. Id. at 419. 
 49. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 14. 
 50. Id. It is interesting to note that the Mejelle, though frequently 
characterized as the first codification of Islamic civil law, is predated in Tunisia 
by Sadek Bey's Civil and Penal Code of 1861. 
 51. See Maaike Voorhoeve, Judges in a web of normative orders: judicial 
practices at the Court of First Instance Tunis in the field of divorce law 52 
(Ph.D. Thesis, University of Amsterdam 2011), available at 
http://dare.uva.nl/record/400650. 
 52. Id.  
 53. See Afif Gaigi, supra note 39, at 419. 
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1883 after signing of the Treaty of Marsa formally established the 
French protectorate and permitted France to directly undertake 
legislative reforms.54 This opened the door to far more expansive 
and ambitious legal projects, among the first of which was an 
effort to codify Tunisia’s civil and commercial law based on the 
French model of codification,55 an effort which, for its successful 
completion, required a deep knowledge of continental civil law, 
sensitivity to local Tunisian custom, and expertise in Islamic law. 
This effort resulted in a remarkable piece of legislation which has 
now been in force for well over a century.  
B. David Santillana and the Synthesis of Civil Law and Islamic 
Law in Tunisia 
During Tunisia’s time as a French protectorate, the task of 
developing a codification of Tunisian civil law ultimately fell on a 
codification commission composed of four French scholars and a 
Tunisian jurist named David Santillana.56 Born in Tunis in 1855, 
Santillana came from a Jewish family of European ancestry.57 
Commentators suggest that Santillana’s family fled to Tunisia after 
the fall of Grenada and the expulsion of the Jewish population.58 
Historical records note that his grandfather, David Diaz Santillana, 
 54. Id. at 419. 
 55. See Charfeggine, supra note 10. 
 56. Santillana is a notable figure in legal history, whose life and 
circumstances paralleled, in interesting ways, that of Moreau-Lislet, in that both 
were civil law jurists whose presence in the jurisdictions where they were to 
have an impact was the result of displacement—making each something of an 
outsider, but not without a definite link with and affinity for their adopted 
jurisdiction. See LEVASSEUR, supra note 9, at 80. 
 57. See Nadhir Ben Ammou, L’Avant Propos De L’Avant-Projet De Code 
Civil Et Commercial Tunisien in LIVRE DU CENTENAIRE DU CODE DES 
OBLIGATIONS ET DES CONTRATS 1906-2006 at 65 (Mohamed Kamel 
Charfeggine ed. 2006). 
 58. Id. See also Jewish History Sourcebook: The Expulsion from Spain, 
1492 CE, available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/jewish/1492-jews-
spain1.asp: “In the spring of 1492, shortly after the Moors were driven out of 
Granada, Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain expelled all the Jews from their lands 
and thus, by a stroke of the pen, put an end to the largest and most distinguished 
Jewish settlement in Europe.” 
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was born in Tunis in 1780 and served as a translator for the British 
Consulate General.59 His father, Moses Santillana, succeeded his 
grandfather as consular interpreter60 and became a close 
companion of Richard Wood, the British Consul in Tunisia, who 
saw to it that the younger David Santillana was educated in an 
Italian school in Tunis.61 Thereafter, Santillana studied law in 
Rome and, after graduation, worked as an attorney both in Rome 
and Florence,62 though still playing a role in controversial legal 
matters across North Africa, such as the legal defense of Ahmed 
Orabi, an Egyptian military officer who staged a revolt against the 
British and French presence in Egypt.63 
Cultivated in such a cosmopolitan and learned environment, 
Santillana grew to become a comparative law scholar, a 
practitioner, and an expert in Islamic law who understood the 
potential for Islamic law’s viability in a modern context.64 As a 
result, when the Commission for the Codification of Tunisian 
Laws was established in 1896, Santillana was a natural choice to 
preside over the commission along with four French legal scholars. 
This commission would produce a draft civil code which would 
eventually become enacted in part as the Tunisian Code of 
Contracts and Obligations.65 To create this remarkable piece of 
legislation, Santillana and his team would draw on a plurality of 
 59. See Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Reports from 
Commissioners, Naturalization Commission, Appendix to the Report, at 9 
(1869). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Ammou, supra note 57. 
 62. Id. 
 63. ALEXANDER MEYRICK BROADLEY, HOW WE DEFENDED ARÁBI AND HIS 
FRIENDS: A STORY OF EGYPT AND THE EGYPTIANS 75 (1884) (referring to 
Santillana as “one of the most accomplished living Arabic scholars”). 
 64. See Donna E. Arzt, The Application of International Human Rights Law 
in Islamic States, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 202, 213-14 (1990) (quoting Santillana as 
writing: “There is no doubt that the high ethical standard of certain parts of Arab 
law acted favourably on the development of our modern concepts and therein 
has its enduring merit.”). 
 65. See GEORGE N. SFEIR, MODERNIZATION OF THE LAW IN ARAB STATES 
39 (1998). 
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sources, namely the French civil code,66 the German civil code,67 
several schools of Islamic jurisprudence (especially the Malikite 
and Hanafite schools),68 and the Ottoman codification of Islamic 
law known as the Mejelle.69 Commentators also note that their 
work was influenced by Tunisian custom, French jurisprudence, 
and the jurisprudence of French courts which were active in 
Tunisia during its time as a French protectorate.70 The character of 
the Tunisian code, therefore, is as diverse and cosmopolitan as its 
principal author. 
The creation of such a code—successfully addressing the needs 
of so diverse a polity—was a complex endeavor. An analysis of his 
work demonstrates that Santillana synthesized diverse sources of 
continental civil law with Islamic law and Tunisian custom 
through four primary methods. The first of these was by direct 
incorporation of Islamic law and legal devices into the codal text. 
The second method was through exploiting the natural parallelisms 
that exist between Islamic law and continental civil law. In that 
regard, scholars have noted that “Islamic Law is rooted in Arabic 
and Middle-Eastern legal traditions, but through its evolution, it 
has assimilated elements of Roman law.”71 The third method used 
by Santillana consisted of excepting Muslims from aspects of the 
civil law which might violate the tenets of Islamic law and, 
thereby, permitting certain transactions between Muslims to occur 
in a way that comports with Islamic law. The fourth method used 
by Santillana involved imparting a religious dimension to 
otherwise secular legal devices, a technique which, in the context 
of Tunisia, naturally tilts in favor of Islamic law. The result is a 
codification of civil law which, at the same time, adheres to the 
 66. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 18.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 12. 
 70. See Voorhoeve, supra note 51, at 54. 
 71. See Ayman Daher, The Shari'a: Roman Law Wearing an Islamic Veil?, 
3 HIRUNDO: THE MCGILL JOURNAL OF CLASSICAL STUDIES 91, 92 (2005). 
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modern civil law model inspired by the French civil code and is 
also uniquely Tunisian. 
III. THE TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS 
Tunisia’s unique legal history and development resulted in a 
somewhat different approach to codification than what is seen 
elsewhere in civil law jurisdictions. Rather than a single, cohesive 
code governing all civil law—or even the “codal dualism”72 that 
characterizes countries in the Middle East and North Africa with 
codes drafted by Abd al-Razzaq Al-Sanhūrī—Tunisian legal 
development has been characterized by what has been called 
“thematic codification.”73 For instance, Tunisian property law is 
now largely governed by the law of 12/2/1965 which enacted the 
Code of Real Rights,74 the Personal Status Code governs “personal 
status law” such as marriage, divorce, and successions,75 etc. As a 
result, among the most notable aspects of the Tunisian Code of 
Obligations and Contracts is its intensely subject-specific focus. 
Centered, as its name implies, on the formation of obligations and 
contracts, the Tunisian Code lacks provisions of broader 
applicability to persons and things that characterize most modern 
civil codes. In that regard, the Tunisian Code consists of only 1531 
total articles which are divided into two books: Book I 
(Obligations in General);76 and Book II (Different Contracts and 
Quasi-Contracts Relating Thereto).77 Commentators have noted 
 72. For a discussion of “codal dualism,” see Dan E. Stigall, Iraqi Civil Law: 
Its Sources, Substance, and Sundering, J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 16, 47 (2006). 
 73. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 40. 
 74. See Afif Gaigi, supra note 39, at 426. 
 75. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 40. Given the diversification of codes in 
Tunisia, it must be emphasized that the Tunisian Code of Obligations and 
Contracts represents but one facet of the corpus of laws that comprise the 
entirety of Tunisian civil law. It is, nonetheless, a critical pillar in the 
architecture of the Tunisian legal system.  
 76. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Book I (Arts. 1-
563). 
 77. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Book II (Arts. 564 – 
1531). 
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that this division, in essence, divides the Tunisian code into a 
“general part” and a “special part,” each of which reflects a 
diversity of sources.78 
A. Sources of Law 
As noted, the Tunisian Code of Obligations and Contracts is 
derived from a plurality of sources, though a study of the manner 
in which those sources are referenced or incorporated into the code 
reveals a fascinating array of legislative feats and codal 
compromises which were necessitated by the political environment 
in which the Tunisian code germinated. Interestingly, in contrast to 
the relatively meticulous and comprehensive approach which 
characterizes the rest of the Tunisian code, the legal provisions 
which concern the Tunisian code’s sources of law (those which 
may be called upon in interpreting the code’s provisions) tend to 
be somewhat recondite. In setting forth the sources of law that may 
be drawn upon for the proper interpretation of codal provisions, the 
Tunisian code states that, in applying the law, one shall give it no 
other meaning than that resulting from the ordinary meaning of the 
law’s provisions and the intent of the legislature.79 The code 
specifically states that “[w]hen the law is expressed in general 
terms, it must be understood in the same sense.”80 Likewise, where 
the law reserves a particular case, it applies to all other cases which 
are not expressly excepted. Where a case cannot be decided by a 
specific provision of the law, a court may look to the provisions 
governing similar cases.81 If the solution is still in doubt, the 
Tunisian code states that a court may decide according to “general 
rules of law,”82 a phrase which is conspicuously inexact and 
nebulous.  
 78. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 14. 
 79. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 532. 
 80. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 533. 
 81. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 535. 
 82. Id. 
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Both the phraseology and the location of these articles of the 
Tunisian code are in striking discord with the articles addressing 
sources of law in most other civil codes, including civil codes in 
the Middle East and North Africa. In comparable codes, the 
sources of law are generally set forth in Article 1 of the civil 
code—an initial article which typically articulates a predictable 
hierarchy of sources.83 For example, the Libyan Civil Code, Syrian 
Civil Code, Egyptian Civil Code, and Algerian Civil Code all 
contain an initial article (Article 1) which governs the sources of 
law and, in essence, states that the written provisions of the code 
govern all matters. In the absence of written provisions, Article 1 
of those codes uniformly states that courts may adjudicate matters 
in accordance with the principles of Islamic law.84 In the absence 
of an Islamic rule on a particular matter, the Libyan, Syrian, 
Egyptian, and Algerian codes permit courts to look to custom and 
the principles of equity.85  
But the Tunisian code is different and does not reference 
Islamic law as a subsidiary source of law, nor any other specific 
body of law. In that regard, Tunisian courts have held that nothing 
in the Tunisian code permits recourse to Islamic law as a source of 
law,86 and commentators have noted that the very ambiguous 
reference in Article 535 to the “general rules of law” offers little 
clarity with regard to other potential sources of law and may have 
been a purposive ambiguity deemed necessary in this early 
codification of Tunisian law.87 Otherwise stated, it has been 
 83. See, e.g., LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE (LA CIV. CODE) art. 1: “The sources of 
law are legislation and custom;” LA CIV. CODE art. 4: “When no rule for a 
particular situation can be derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound 
to proceed according to equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to justice, 
reason, and prevailing usages.” 
 84. See LIBYAN CIVIL CODE, Art. 1, para. 2.; SYRIAN CIVIL CODE, Art. 1. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See STÉPHANE PAPI, L’INFLUENCE JURIDIQUE ISLAMIQUE AU MAGHREB 
235 n.1273 (2009). 
 87. See M. Mohamed Kamel Charfeddine, Esquisse sur la méthode 
normative retenue dans l'élaboration du Code tunisien des obligations et 
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suggested that this is a simple prudence, designed to allow the code 
to take root and become integrated into Tunisian society.88 
Interestingly, Professor Haider Ala Hamoudi, in his excellent 
work on post-conflict constitution drafting in Iraq, posits that when 
formulating national legislation such as a constitution in a post-
conflict environment where key stake-holders may have 
pronounced “identitarian commitments,” it is sometimes 
advantageous for drafters to permit such legislative lacunae to exist 
so that long-term solutions can be incrementally achieved.89  
[T]he solution well may be to proceed with constitution 
making, but on particularly difficult problems—namely 
those in which any view to the long term is likely to raise 
the prospect of intractable disputes based on quite 
inconsistent conceptions of statehood—to defer the 
problem for later, incremental resolution. In other words, 
on such matters of dispute, the solution might well be, 
counterintuitively, to push the problem off in a manner that 
will reduce the stakes.90 
Santillana seems to have taken just such an approach with the 
Tunisian code insofar as it remains ambiguous as to which sources 
of law may be invoked by Tunisian courts. There are, however, 
other ways that a legal source can find influence in a civil code 
beyond express references. Even where a code does not expressly 
permit recourse to a certain body of law—such as Islamic law—
elements from a legal tradition may still find relevance by being 
des contrats, 48 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ. 421, 440 
(1996): 
Ambiguïté voulue ou ambiguïté dictée par la crainte d'une mise en 
cause par les juges de l'œuvre d'unification législative du droit des 
obligations réalisée pour la première fois en Tunisie? A moins qu'il ne 
s'agisse que d'une simple prudence pour enraciner le nouveau code et 
permettre son intégration en imposant le respect strict de ses 
dispositions. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See HAIDER ALA HAMOUDI, NEGOTIATING IN CIVIL CONFLICT: 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION AND IMPERFECT BARGAINING IN IRAQ 224 
(2013). 
 90. Id. 
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incorporated into the codal text or through more subtle 
mechanisms which permit those sources to exude influence. This is 
certainly true for Santillana’s work in the Tunisian code which 
sought to incorporate Islamic legal principles and to blend those 
legal rules with European legal norms, effectively fusing two 
normative orders.91  
B. Formation of Obligations and Contracts 
Belknani notes that the general provisions relating to 
obligations in the Tunisian code are essentially drawn from the 
continental civil law tradition.92 Continental civil law, in that 
regard, envisions an obligation as something more expansive than 
simply a contract (though a contract can certainly form an 
obligation). Deriving the concept of an obligation from Roman 
law, civil law theorists have maintained that an obligation is “a 
legal relationship that compels us to give, to do, or to not do 
something.”93 This allows for obligations that are bilateral (such as 
contracts) but also for unilateral obligations by which only a single 
party is bound.94  
In Roman law, according to a text by Gaius, all obligations 
derive from contract, delict, and several other causes. On 
that basis, the Corpus Juris asserts the existence of four 
sources of obligations which, as universally accepted by 
doctrine with almost no exception, are contracts, quasi-
contracts, delicts, and quasi-delicts.95 
 91. See Voorhoeve, supra note 51, at 54: “Santillana explicitly referred to 
the Ottoman Mecelle and Qadri Pasha’s works as sources of inspiration, as well 
as Sahnun’s Mudawwana and Khalil’s Mukhtasar. When choosing between 
different solutions from Islamic law, the principle that was closest to French law 
was chosen.” 
 92. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 21. 
 93. A.M. DEMANTE, 3 PROGRAMME DU COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 
246 (1833). 
 94. DEMANTE, supra note 93, at 248. 
 95. SAÚL LITVINOFF, 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, THE LAW OF 
OBLIGATIONS, §1.6, at 10 (2001). 
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The Tunisian code’s first article states that obligations are 
derived from conventions and other declarations of will, quasi-
contracts, delicts, and quasi-delicts.96 Similarly, under Tunisian 
law, the elements necessary for a valid obligation are: (1) the 
capacity to form an obligation; (2) a valid declaration concerning 
the essential elements of the obligation; (3) a definite object that 
can be the object of an obligation; and (4) a lawful cause for the 
obligation97—requirements which echo civil law based on the 
French model and which adopt the continental civil law 
paradigm.98 It must be noted, however, that these rules are also 
consistent with Islamic law which requires people entering into 
contracts to be of sound mind,99 a lawful object for contracts,100 
and which requires contracts to have a lawful cause.101  
Under Tunisian law, all persons have the capacity to form 
obligations unless declared otherwise by the law102 and, notably, 
the Tunisian Code expressly states that religious differences 
between muslims and non-muslims has no bearing on the capacity 
to contract, nor do such religious differences impact obligations 
between muslims and non-muslims.103 Importantly, however, the 
Tunisian code—as explained more fully below—contains a host of 
 96. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1. This article 
is almost identical in substance to Article 1757 of the Louisiana Civil Code 
which states that “[o]bligations arise from contracts and other declarations of 
will. They also arise directly from the law, regardless of a declaration of will, in 
instances such as wrongful acts, the management of the affairs of another, unjust 
enrichment and other acts or facts. LA CIV. CODE art. 1757 
 97. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 2. 
 98. DEMANTE, supra note 93, at 252: “Ces conditions sont au nombre de 
quatre: le consentement, la capacité, l’objet et la cause.” 
 99. MEJELLE, Art. 957 (“Infants, madmen and people of unsound mind 
(Ma’tuh) are of themselves prohibited from dealing with their property”), and 
Art. 966 (“When an infant has not understanding for business (Art. 943) even if 
his guardian give him permission, his verbal dispositions of property are 
fundamentally invalid.”). 
 100. MEJELLE, Art. 197 (“The existence of the thing sold is necessary”) and 
Art. 199 (“It is necessary that the thing sold should be [permitted by law].”). 
 101. MEJELLE, Art. 211. 
 102. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 3. 
 103. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 4. 
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provisions that provide for exceptions in the case of contracts 
between muslims.  
1. Unilateral Acts 
Civil law doctrine recognizes, to varying degrees, the concept 
of a unilateral act.104 Planiol attributed the more modern approach 
of permitting a unilateral declaration to form a binding obligation 
to German jurists.105 While a relatively recent innovation during 
Planiol’s era, unilateral acts are now well-founded in modern civil 
law doctrine. As Litvinoff noted, “under certain circumstances, the 
law may attach consequences to a merely unilateral declaration of 
will which is promissory in nature.”106 Under Tunisian law, while 
a mere promise does not operate to create an obligation,107 a 
promise made by posters or other means of advertising which offer 
a reward to one who finds a lost object or accomplishes a task can 
create an obligation, and is deemed to be accepted by those who, 
even without having knowledge of the offer, find the thing or 
accomplish the task.108 In such circumstances, the author of the 
promise is required to provide the promised reward.109 
Interestingly, while these provisions comport with the civil law 
model, they are drawn more from the German model than the 
French Code Civil and mirror quite closely the 1984 amendments 
to the Louisiana Civil Code, which “adopted the German-oriented 
 104. The degree to which unilateral declarations are considered sources of 
obligations varies among modern civil codes. See, e.g., Pablo Lerner, Promises 
of Rewards in a Comparative Perspective, 10 ANNUAL SURVEY OF 
INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 53, 57 (2004): 
If Puffendorf definitively installed the pactum as the central idea, it was 
Domat who simplified the problem by putting forth the agreement as 
the only expression of the autonomy of will. His ideas were adopted by 
the French legislator, and so the French code does not recognize the 
unilateral will as a source of obligation. 
 105. 2 PLANIOL, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 273 (9th ed., 1923). 
 106. LITVINOFF, supra note 95, at 13-14. 
 107. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 18. 
 108. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 19. 
 109. Id. 
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solution, reserving the promise of reward only for the case of 
performance of a specific fact.”110 
Tunisian law further states that the promise of reward may not 
be revoked where the revocation occurs after execution has 
begun.111 One who has set a deadline for the completion of the task 
envisioned by the promise is deemed to have waived the right to 
revoke the promise until the expiration of the time limit.112 If 
several people have accomplished the task at the same time, the 
promised prize or reward is shared between them.113 If they have 
done it at various times, the award belongs to the first to 
accomplish it. If they each accomplished a portion of the task, then 
the reward is shared proportionally.114 If the reward cannot be 
shared but can be sold, then the price will be shared among the 
beneficiaries.115 If this price or reward is an object that has no 
market value or can only be given to one person, then according to 
the terms of the promise, the decision is made by drawing lots (“la 
décision est remise à la voie du sort”).116 This latter provision is 
also taken directly from the German civil code,117 thus 
demonstrating Santillana’s reliance on a plurality of European civil 
law sources when drafting the Tunisian code. 
2. Contracts (Bilateral Acts) 
The notion of a bilateral act, of course, dates back to ancient 
times and was well-developed in Roman law.118 Modernity and 
 110. Lerner, supra note 104, at 63. 
 111. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 20. 
 112. Id. 
 113. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 21. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See BGB, Art. 659(2): 
If the act has been undertaken simultaneously by more than one person, 
then each is entitled to an equal portion of the reward. Where the 
reward cannot be shared due to its quality, or if, according to the terms 
of the promise of a reward, only one person is to be given the reward, 
then the matter is decided by drawing lots. 
 118. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 333. 
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commerce only increased the frequency of this method for forming 
obligations. Writing in the 19th century, civil law jurist A.M. 
Demante noted that, even during that era, the majority of 
obligations were formed through the creation of contracts.119 The 
general rule in modern civil law is that a contract is formed by the 
consent of the parties to the contract.120 Consistent with this 
theory, under Tunisian law, a contract is perfected only by 
agreement of the parties on the essential elements of the obligation, 
as well as on all other lawful clauses that the parties consider 
essential to the agreement.121 Barring a provision to the contrary, 
changes by the parties by mutual agreement to the contract which 
occur immediately after its conclusion do not constitute a new 
contract, but are considered part of the initial agreement.122 Even 
so, a contract is not perfected when the parties expressly reserve 
certain clauses to form the object of a subsequent agreement.123 
The agreement reached under these conditions, on one or more 
such clauses, does not constitute the conclusion of a contract, even 
if a preliminary agreement has been drawn up in writing.124 In any 
case, reservations or restrictions which are not brought to the 
attention of the other party are not set aside or restrict the effects of 
the declaration of intent as provided for in its apparent 
expression.125 
C. Transfer of Obligations 
Consistent with the continental civil law tradition, the Tunisian 
civil code permits the transfer of obligations. As Litvinoff noted, 
“[a]s an asset in his patrimony, the creditor or obligee may transfer 
or assign the obligation to another if he so wishes. Also, the debtor 
 119. A.M. DEMANTE, 2 PROGRAMME DU COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 
246 (1831). 
 120. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 333. 
 121. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 23. 
 122. Id. 
 123. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 24. 
 124. Id. 
 125. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 25. 
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may substitute another person at his end of the relation. In both 
instances the obligation remains the same, however.”126 Under 
Tunisian law, the transfer of rights and claims of an original 
creditor to another person can take place, either pursuant to the 
provisions of Tunisian law or pursuant to an agreement between 
the parties.127 Rights or claims that are not yet expired may be 
transferred,128 though such a transfer may not operate for future 
rights.129 Similarly, the transfer is considered null: where the right 
or claim may not be transferred by virtue of its constitutive title or 
by law; where it is intended that the rights or claims are of a purely 
personal nature; or where the debt cannot be subject to seizure or 
attachment—though when the right or claim is susceptible of being 
seized with the concurrence of a party or to have its value 
determined, the assignment of the right will be valued in the same 
proportion.130 The assignment of a claim includes the accessories 
that are integral to the claim, such as privileges, with the exception 
of those that are personal to the assignor.131 It includes wages, 
mortgages and sureties unless there is an express stipulation to the 
contrary.132  
Notably, an assignment is also assumed to include accrued 
interest unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. This latter 
provision relating to interest, however, is not applicable between 
Muslims.133 This exception pertaining to Muslims, of course, is 
due to the provisions of Islamic law which disallow the charging of 
interest in the course of transactions.134 The authority for this 
doctrine in Islamic law—which is not interpreted with precise 
 126. LITVINOFF, supra note 95. 
 127. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 199. 
 128. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 200. 
 129. Id. 
 130. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 201. 
 131. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 210. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. ABDUR RAHIM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MUHAMMADAN JURISPRUDENCE 
ACCORDING TO THE HANAFI, MALIKI, SHAFII AND HANBALI SCHOOLS 294-95 
(1911). 
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uniformity135—is from Quranic exhortations against the idea of 
ribā (or interest)136 and sunna in which the Prophet is reported to 
have said as follows: 
(Sell) gold for gold and silver for silver, wheat for wheat, 
barley for barley, dates for dates and salt for salt of the 
same kind for the same kind and the same quantity for the 
same quantity, from hand to hand and if they differ from 
each other in quantity sell them as you like but from hand 
to hand.137  
In permitting an exception to ordinary civil law for Muslims 
where interest is involved, Santillana adopts a civil law concept but 
in a way which permits compatibility with Islamic legal tenets.  
D. Extinction of Obligations 
The Tunisian code’s articles on the extinction of obligations 
are drawn from civil law in that they incorporate civil law concepts 
of remission of debt, novation, compensation, and confusion. 
Notably, however, these articles also incorporate Islamic legal 
concepts that provide traditional protections and limit the civil law 
concepts to the extent their operability could transgress Islamic 
legal boundaries.  
 135. RAHIM, supra note 134, at 294:  
The Hanafi doctors have interpreted the tradition to mean that 
whenever an article belonging to the description of similar of capacity 
or of weight is sold or exchanged for an article of the same species, 
neither party is allowed to receive anything in excess of the quantity 
sold by himself , in other words absolute equality in quantity is insisted 
upon. The Shafi’is hold that the law of riba only applies to articles of 
food and such things as constitute price, namely gold and silver. 
 136. YASIN DUTTON, THE ORIGINS OF ISLAMIC LAW: THE QUR’AN, THE 
MUWATTA, AND MADINAN ‘AMAL 149 (2002):  
Ribā, like zakat, was another situation where the general judgment in 
the Qur’an as clear but the precise details problematic. The main 
prohibition against ribā comes in Q 2: 278-9 where we read that those 
who practice ribā should be aware that they have engaged in “a war 
with Allah and His Messenger,” from which the “ulamā” derived the 
judgement that those who engage in ribā and refuse to repent are, if 
they have a power-base [are to be fought as rebels]. 
 137. RAHIM, supra note 134, at 294. 
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1. Remission of Debt 
A remission of debt, according to civil law doctrine, is a 
unilateral act by which a creditor renounces his or her rights 
against a debtor.138 Such an act produces a liberation of the debtor, 
extinguishing the debt and all accessory obligations pertaining to 
the debt.139 Tunisian law incorporates this concept, though alloyed 
with Islamic legal concepts. Under Tunisian law, an obligation is 
extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the obligation by a 
creditor that is considered capable of making a donation.140 The 
remission takes effect as long as it has not been expressly refused 
by the debtor.141 Tunisian law also notes, however, that the 
remission granted by an ill person to a third party during his or her 
last illness is valid up to a maximum of one-third of what remains 
in the succession after the payment of debts and funeral 
expenses.142 This latter provision is derived from Islamic law 
which generally places a limit of one third of the estate on the 
amount which a person may bequest (preserving the remainder of 
the decedent’s estate for family members)143 and, therefore, 
placing cautionary limits on the ability of an ill person to alienate 
property and extinguish debts in excess of that limit. For instance, 
the Mejelle provides as follows: 
If someone in his mortal sickness has given something to 
one of his heirs and has died, if the other heirs do not allow 
it, that gift is not good.  
But if he has made a gift and delivered it to a person who is 
not an heir of his, and a third of his estate is sufficient for 
 138. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 198.  
 139. Id. 
 140. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 350. 
 141. Id. 
 142. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 355. 
 143. See, e.g., UN-Habitat, Islam, Land & Property Research Series, Paper 
6: Islamic Inheritance Laws and Systems, at 10 (2005), available at 
ww2.unhabitat.org/programmes/landtenure/documents/ILP%206.doc: “[A] 
Muslim’s ability to bequeath is restricted to only one-third of an individual's 
estate under certain rules with the remaining two-thirds devolving according to 
the compulsory inheritance rules.” 
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the whole of the gift, it is good. 
If it is not sufficient, and the heirs do not permit the gift, 
the gift is good up to the amount, for which the third of the 
estate is sufficient. The rest, the donee is compelled to 
return.144  
The Tunisian code, therefore, incorporates the Islamic legal 
limitation of “one third of the estate” into the civil law concept of 
remission of debt and protections designed to maintain the 
integrity of Islamic inheritance law. Otherwise, the Tunisian codal 
language is largely consistent with other modern civil codes, 
holding that the release of any debt in general and without 
reservation cannot be revoked.145 Special provisions, however, 
exempt the finality of such remissions made by an heir in the case 
of an inherited debt and where that remission was justified by 
fraud or deceit on the part of the debtor or other people acting in 
complicity with the debtor.146 It is worth noting here, however, that 
many continental civil law jurisdictions, likewise, maintain the 
concept of “forced heirship” (deriving their rules in that regard 
from Roman law) and similarly prohibit bequests in excess of a 
certain portion of the decedent’s estate.147 The Tunisian, Islamic, 
Roman, and continental civil law rules tend to blur into one 
another at such legal intersections. 
2. Novation  
The concept of novation is drawn from Roman law but was 
adapted by civil law jurists throughout the ages so that it is 
applicable to modern contracts and obligations.148 Under Tunisian 
law, novation is the extinction of an obligation due to the creation 
 144. MEJELLE, Art. 879. 
 145. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 356. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Joseph Dainow, The Early Sources of Forced Heirship: Its History in 
Texas and Louisiana, 4 LA. L. REV. 60 (1941) (Noting that in Louisiana “as in 
both French and Spanish law, excessive dispositions are not null, but are 
reducible to the disposable quantum.”). 
 148. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 178: “La novation est un procédé d’origine 
romaine mais qui s’est bien transformé depuis l’antiquité.” 
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of a new obligation which is substituted for it.149 Novation cannot 
be presumed and, to the contrary, the desire for a novation must be 
expressed.150 Both the former obligation and the newly formed 
obligation must be considered legally valid obligations for 
novation to have effect.151 
The Tunisian Code provides that novation occurs in three types 
of circumstances: (1) when the creditor and debtor agree to 
substitute a new obligation for the former, which extinguishes or 
changes the cause of the former obligation; (2) when a new debtor 
is substituted for the former who is discharged by the creditor 
(such a substitution may take place without the participation of the 
first debtor); and/or (3) where, by the effect of a new commitment, 
a new creditor is substituted for the former creditor, thus 
discharging the debtor vis-à-vis the former creditor.152 Such a 
definition comports with the concept of novation as it appears in 
modern civil codes based on the French model.153 
3. Compensation 
Civil law doctrine maintains that when two people owe to one 
another similar obligations, it is not necessary that each one pay 
the other. Rather, it is simpler to consider each obligation 
reciprocally extinguished up to the amount of the lesser debt.154 
Litvinoff notes that, in civil law systems based on the French 
model, “[c]ompensation takes place by operation of law, that is, 
independently of the will of the parties. The two obligations 
extinguish each other reciprocally, to the extent of the lesser 
 149. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 357. 
 150. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 358. 
 151. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 359. 
 152. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 361. 
 153. See, e.g., LA CIV. CODE art. 1881: “Novation takes place when, by 
agreement of the parties, a new performance is substituted for that previously 
owed, or a new cause is substituted for that of the original obligation. If any 
substantial part of the original performance is still owed, there is no novation.” 
 154. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 189; LA CIV. CODE art. 1893. 
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object, as soon as they co-exist.”155 In systems based on the 
German model, in contrast, “compensation does not take place 
automatically, but must be raised as a defense by the interested 
party. . . .”156 
Tunisian law also recognizes this civil law concept, though 
with a typically Tunisian variant on the theme. According to the 
Tunisian Code, “[c]ompensation occurs when parties are mutually 
and personally creditor and debtor of the other. It does not take 
place between Muslims in cases where it would constitute a 
violation of religious law.”157 Santillana, therefore, again adopts a 
civil law concept but permits an exception to it for Muslims insofar 
as it might run afoul of the tenets of Islamic law. Otherwise, 
Tunisian law permits that compensation may take place between 
debts which have different causes or are of different portions.158 
When the two debts are not of the same sum, compensation is 
carried out up to a maximum of the lesser debt.159 Consistent with 
civil law doctrine, Tunisian law provides that compensation takes 
place between debts of same kind and quality.160 Tunisian law 
requires that the two debts must be liquidated and presently due, 
but it is not necessary that they be payable at the same place.161  
4. Confusion 
Planiol defines the civil law concept of confusion as the union 
of the two qualities of creditor and debtor in the same person (“la 
reunion sur la même tête des deux qualités de créancier et de 
débiteur”) and notes that this concept most frequently finds 
application by the effect of a succession in which a creditor 
 155. LITVINOFF, supra note 95. 
 156. Id. 
 157. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 369. 
 158. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 377. 
 159. Id. 
 160. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 373. 
 161. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 374. 
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inherits a debt.162 Under Tunisian law, when the qualities of 
creditor and debtor of an obligation is together in the same person, 
there is a confusion of rights which eliminates the relationship 
between creditor and debtor.163 Consistent with civil law doctrine, 
the Tunisian code provides that confusion may be total or partial, 
depending on whether it occurs for the entire obligation or only a 
portion.164 When the cause that produces confusion disappears, the 
credit-right is revived along with its accessories, for all persons, 
and confusion is deemed to have never occurred.165 The Tunisian 
articles on confusion are scant, but maintain the civil law concept 
without modification. 
E. Vices of Consent 
Continental civil law has traditionally held that “le dol, l’erreur 
et la violence sont les trois causes qui vicient la volonté.”166 As 
civil law jurist Saul Litvinoff noted when explaining this concept: 
Autonomy of the will is the basic idea that underlies the 
doctrine of juridical acts implicit in the civil codes of 
France and Louisiana. From the vantage point of that idea, 
a person’s declaration of will produces the intended legal 
effects when the consent it expresses is informed by a 
reason, a cause, and is also free from interfering 
circumstances that frustrate its intention. As clearly stated 
in the Code Napoleon, consent is invalid when it has been 
given through error, extorted by duress, or obtained by 
fraud. When such is the case, though consent has come into 
existence, it is impaired, defective, it is tainted by a vice 
that affects its freedom.167 
 162. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 197. 
 163. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 382. 
 164. Id. 
 165. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 383. 
 166. PLANIOL, supra at 105, at 165. 
 167. See Saul Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, Error, Fraud, Duress, and an 
Epilogue on Lesion, 50 LA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1989). 
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Islamic law, likewise, has long held that fraud,168 error,169 and 
duress170 are grounds for rescinding contracts. These legal 
provisions, therefore, form an area of comparative overlap between 
Islamic law and continental civil law.  
The Tunisian Code incorporates this framework for vitiation of 
consent—though clearly drawing its provisions principally from 
the French model. Accordingly, under Tunisian law, the consent of 
a party is annullable when it is given in error, when induced by 
fraud, and when it is obtained through violence.171  
1. Error 
Error, under the Tunisian code, can give rise to rescission when 
it is a legal error or a factual error.172 With regard to legal error, 
such an error may result in rescission when (1) it is the sole or 
principal cause for the obligation; and (2) if it is excusable.173 A 
factual error, likewise, may give rise to rescission when it bears on 
the identity, type, or quality of the object of the obligation.174 
Simple errors in calculation, however, do not give rise to 
rescission, but they must be rectified.175 
2. Violence 
The vice of consent termed “violence” in the Tunisian code is 
defined as “coercion without the authority of the law, and subject 
to which one brings a person to perform an act to which he or she 
did not consent.”176 Violence, under Tunisian law, gives rise to 
 168. See RAHIM, supra note 134, at 237; see also MEJELLE, Art. 20 and Art. 
52. 
 169. See RAHIM, supra note 134, at 237; see also MEJELLE, Art. 29 and Art. 
32. 
 170. See RAHIM, supra note 134, at 232-237; see also MEJELLE, Art. 52. 
 171. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 43. 
 172. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 44 and 45. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 47. 
 176. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 50. 
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rescission when that violence was the principal cause for 
undertaking the obligation and when—having regard to age, 
gender, status of the person and their level of impressionability—
the violence consists of acts that are of such a nature that they are 
likely to produce physical suffering, or profound mental suffering 
(from fear, exposing that person’s honor or possessions to material 
injury).177 
The fear inspired by the threat of prosecution or other legal 
channels generally will not give rise to rescission under Tunisian 
law unless the person making the threat does so in a way that 
qualifies as legally cognizable violence (the sorts of will-
overtaking threats described above) and is done so in a way that 
abuses the position of the threatened party by seeking to extort 
excessive or undue benefits from him or her.178  
Violence gives rise to rescission of the obligation, even if it 
was not exercised by one of the parties to the obligation179 and 
even if it was exercised upon a person with which the contracting 
party is closely related by blood.180 Reverential fear, however, 
does not give rise to rescission of an obligation unless also 
accompanied by serious threats or assault.181 
3. Fraud 
Fraud gives rise to rescission when the tactics or non-
disclosures of one of the parties, or a person who represents or is 
complicit with that party, are of such a nature that without these 
tactics or non-disclosures, the other party would not have 
contracted.182 The deceit practiced by a third party has the same 
effect, when the party that benefits from that fraud had knowledge 
 177. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 51. 
 178. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 52. 
 179. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 53. 
 180. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 54. 
 181. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 55. 
 182. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 56. 
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of it.183 Fraud with regard to the accessories of the obligation and 
which was not central to the obligation can give rise only to 
damages and not rescission.184 
4. Additional Bases for Rescission 
There is reason to rescind when the party who contracted was 
in a state of drunkenness, which has troubled his faculties.185 The 
reasons for rescission based on the State of disease and other 
similar cases, are subject to the discretion of the judges.186 
Under Tunisian law, lesion does not give rise to rescission, 
unless it is caused by fraud by the other party, the other party’s 
representative, or by one who acted for the other party.187 The only 
exception to this is when the injured party is a minor or is 
incompetent, even though he or she would have contracted with 
the assistance of his guardian or legal counsel in the manner 
determined by law and although there be no fraud by the other 
party.188 Lesion is defined as any obligation entailing a price 
differential beyond a third of the given price and the actual value 
of the thing.189 
F. Contract of Sale 
A review of the Tunisian provisions relating to the contract of 
sale reveal an equally interesting blending of continental civil law 
with Islamic legal precepts, both by incorporating requirements 
that adhere to the Islamic law of sales and by creating strategic 
exceptions where Islamic law and continental civil law diverge.  
At the outset, the Tunisian code obviously incorporates 
classical civil law concepts into its provisions on the contract of 
 183. Id. 
 184. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 57. 
 185. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 58. 
 186. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 59. 
 187. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 60. 
 188. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 61. 
 189. Id. 
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sale. In the continental civil law system, “a sale is a contract by 
which a person, who is called the vendor, obliges himself to 
transfer the ownership of a thing to another, whereas the other 
person, who is the buyer, obliges himself to pay the value of the 
thing in money.”190 The necessary elements of such a sale are the 
consent of the parties, a thing to be sold, and a price to be paid.191 
Modern civil codes around the globe maintain this basic concept of 
the contract of sale. For instance, under the Louisiana Civil Code, a 
“[s]ale is a contract whereby a person transfers ownership of a 
thing to another for a price in money. The thing, the price, and the 
consent of the parties are requirements for the perfection of a 
sale.”192  
The Tunisian code incorporates this very model for the contract 
of sale. Under Tunisian law, a sale is a contract by which one party 
transfers ownership of a thing or a right to another contracting 
party for a price which the latter obligates himself or herself to 
pay.193 A contract of sale is perfected between the parties, as soon 
as there is consent of the contracting parties (one to sell and the 
other to buy) and the parties agree on the thing, the price and the 
other terms of the contract.194 The Tunisian code, moreover, 
requires that the selling price in a contract of sale must be 
determined. A contract of sale cannot refer the determination of the 
selling price to a third party or the price paid by a third party, 
unless the price is known to the contracting parties.195 The contract 
may, however, refer to the fixed market price, or a determined rate, 
or the average of the market prices, when it comes to goods which 
do not have a variable price.196 When the price is variable, 
contracting parties are presumed to be referring to the average 
 190. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 462. 
 191. Id. at 464.  
 192. LA CIV. CODE art. 2439. 
 193. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 564. 
 194. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 580. 
 195. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 579. 
 196. Id. 
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market price.197 These requirements are consonant with classical 
continental civil law insofar as the price must be fixed, but seem to 
gravitate more toward Islamic law in the rigidity of this 
requirement. As Planiol notes, continental civil law has long 
permitted the price in a contract of sale to be determined by outside 
experts or arbiters,198 and modern civil codes based on the French 
model have permitted even more laxity with regard to prices set by 
third parties and even courts.199 Islamic law, in contrast, has more 
adamantly required that the price be determined at the time of the 
formation of the contract.200 This is due to the prohibition on 
gharar (the sale of “items whose existence or characteristics is not 
certain, the risky nature of which makes the transaction akin to 
gambling”).201 Commentators note that a sale in which the price is 
deferred is an example of gharar.202 The Tunisian code, by 
expressly disallowing the selling price to be determined by third 
persons, thus, aligns more consistently with Islamic law than 
continental civil law.  
Islamic law’s influence on Tunisian law becomes even more 
pronounced in its articles which hold that a sale is considered null 
if it is for things that, by nature or circumstances, are unlikely to be 
delivered to the purchaser; for example: the fish in the water, the 
 197. Id. 
 198. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 468, (1923): “La fixation du prix est parfois 
chose difficile, et les parties conviennent de s’en rapporter pour son chiffre à 
l’appréciation d’un ou de plusiers arbitres ou experts. Ce procédé est licite. . . .” 
 199. See, e.g., LA CIV. CODE art. 2645: “The price may be left to the 
determination of a third person. If the parties fail to agree on or to appoint such a 
person, or if the one appointed is unable or unwilling to make a determination, 
the price may be determined by the court.” 
 200. MEJELLE, Art. 237:“It is necessary that the price should be named at the 
time of the sale (Bey`). Therefore, if the price of the thing sold is not mentioned 
at the time of the sale, the sale is bad (Fasid).” See also MEJELLE, Art. 238: “It is 
necessary that the price should be known.” 
 201. MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND 
PRACTICE 58 (2006).  
 202. Abdul-Rahim Al-Saati, The Permissible Gharar (Risk) in Classical 
Islamic Jurisprudence, 16 J.KAU: ISLAMIC ECON. 3, 8, available at 
http://balmeena.kau.edu.sa/Files/320/Researches/50833_20970.pdf (noting that 
“[d]eferment of the price to an unknown future date” is an example of a gharar 
sale).  
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bird in the air, the escaped animal.203 This prohibition also relates 
directly to the prohibition on gharar sales. Commentators have 
noted that Islamic law, to varying degrees, has disallowed the sale 
of fish in the water and escaped things.204 “Other hadiths, still of 
contemporary relevance, forbid the sale of a bird in the air, a fish 
in the water, an escaped animal or slave, or anything else that the 
vendor might be unable to deliver owing to lack of possession.”205 
Perhaps even more strikingly, any contract of sale is, likewise, 
considered null if it is between Muslims and for things declared 
unclean by religious law (la loi religieuse) except the objects 
which “religious law” has authorized for trade, such as animal 
fertilizer for agricultural purposes.206 Thus, Tunisian civil law 
expressly incorporates Islamic law into its law regulating contracts 
and prohibits contracts which would violate its precepts. 
Under Tunisian law, the buyer acquires full ownership of the 
thing sold, as soon as the contract is perfected by the consent of the 
parties.207 As soon as the contract of sale is perfected, the buyer 
may dispose of the thing sold, even before delivery.208 Likewise, 
the seller may assign his or her right to payment, even before the 
delivery of the thing, unless there is a contrary agreement by the 
parties.209 Such provisions align with continental civil law which 
does not require delivery of the thing in order to have transfer of 
ownership in a contract of sale.210 Interestingly, however, the 
Tunisian code provides that these latter provisions relating to 
transfer of ownership prior to delivery are inapplicable with regard 
to the sale of foodstuffs among Muslims.211 As noted above, 
 203. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 571. 
 204. ABDULLAH ALWI HAJI HASSAN, SALES AND CONTRACTS IN EARLY 
ISLAMIC COMMERCIAL LAW 80 (2007). 
 205. DAVID EISENBERG, ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW AND PRACTICE 2.69 (2012). 
 206. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 575. 
 207. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 583. 
 208. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 584. 
 209. Id. 
 210. DEMANTE, supra note 93, at 141 (“La délivrance ou tradition n’est plus 
aujourd’hui requise pour transférer la propriété[.]” 
 211. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 584. 
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Islamic law in regard to such contracts has very specific 
requirements with regard to riba212 and, in this instance, the 
Tunisian code seems to partially codify the sunna admonishing 
believers to 
[sell] gold for gold and silver for silver, wheat for wheat, 
barley for barley, dates for dates and salt for salt of the 
same kind for the same kind and the same quantity for the 
same quantity, from hand to hand and if they differ from 
each other in quantity sell them as you like but from hand 
to hand.213  
Moreover, Islamic law, as reflected in the Mejelle, is more 
limiting with regard to what one may do before delivery of the 
thing. The Mejelle permits a seller to “dispose of the price of a 
thing sold before he has received it,”214 and, in the case of 
immoveable property that “the purchaser can sell to another, before 
delivery, the property sold. . . .”215 Moveable property, however, 
cannot generally be sold to another before delivery.216 The 
Mejelle, likewise, gives special significance to delivery in sales 
involving things sold in quantities that are weighed and do not 
suffer damage by division (such as corn) in that such a sale 
becomes final when there is delivery and the amount delivered is 
correct.217 Otherwise, the buyer is given a right of option and may 
annul the sale or purchase the lesser amount.218 Under the 
 212. ABU-MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH BIN ABI-ZAYD & ABDUR-RAHMAN AL-
QYRAWANI, THE GIST OF THE TREATISE ON MALIKITE JURISPRUDENCE 84 
(1994):  
When grains, legumes, and preserved foodstuffs are bartered in kind, 
the quantity received should be equal to the quantity given; no delay in 
delivery is allowed in this exchange. It is forbidden to barter foodstuff 
delivered immediately for foodstuff to be delivered at a subsequent 
time, whether the exchange is in kind or not, whether the foodstuff is 
perishable or not. 
 213. RAHIM, supra note 134, at 294. 
 214. MEJELLE, Art. 252. 
 215. MEJELLE, Art. 253. 
 216. Id. 
 217. MEJELLE, Art. 223. 
 218. Id. 
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Mejelle’s provisions, if there is excess in such a case, the surplus 
belongs to the seller.219 
Belknani similarly highlights article 565 of the Tunisian code, 
relating to the sale of a thing by an ill person on his or her 
deathbed.220 According to that article, the sale by an ill person on 
his or her deathbed (“during his last illness”), where it is made to 
one of his heirs with the intention to favor that heir (for example, 
the thing is sold at a price much lower than the real value of the 
thing) is governed by the provisions of article 354 of the Tunisian 
code,221 which, in turn, states that a remission of debt made by an 
ill person on his or her deathbed to one of his heirs is valid only if 
the other heirs ratify the act.222 In contrast, the sale by an ill person 
to a non-heir is governed by the provisions of article 355 of the 
Tunisian code223 which states that a remission of debt granted by 
an ill person to a third party is valid up to a maximum of one-third 
of what remains in the estate after the payment of debts and funeral 
expenses.224 Accordingly, under Tunisian law, such a sale could be 
limited depending on what debts and expenses remain after the 
death of the seller. Belknani notes that such a sale would be 
considered mawküf under Islamic law,225 and a review of Islamic 
jurisprudence finds this provision of the Tunisian code to be 
derived from the Mejelle: 
If a sick person sells something to one of his heirs while he 
is in his death sickness, it is dependent on the permission of 
the other heirs, if, after the death of the sick person, they 
give permission, it takes effect, if they do not give 
permission, it does not take effect.226 
 219. Id.  
 220. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 22 n.99. 
 221. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 565. 
 222. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 354. 
 223. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 565. 
 224. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 355. 
 225. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 23. 
 226. MEJELLE, Art. 393. 
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Similarly, the Mejelle provides that if a sick person while in his 
death sickness sells something, for a price less than the value of the 
thing and a third of his property “is not sufficient to provide for the 
benefit, the purchaser is compelled to make good the reduction in 
the price, and if he [does not] make [the reduction], the heirs can 
annul the sale.”227  
In addition, Belknani highlights article 576 of the Tunisian 
code, relating to the sale of a thing belonging to another, as an 
example of Islamic legal doctrine being incorporated into the 
Tunisian code.228 According to this article, the sale of a thing 
belonging to another is valid: (1) if the true owner of the thing 
ratifies the sale; or (2) if the seller then acquires ownership of the 
thing. Where the true owner refuses to ratify the sale, the purchaser 
may ask for dissolution of the sale. The seller is liable for damages 
when the purchaser was unaware at the time of the sale that the 
thing belonged to another. The nullification of the contract, 
however, can never be opposed by the seller due to the fact that the 
thing belonged to another.229 
G. Contract of Exchange 
Civil law jurist A.M. Demante, writing in the 19th Century, 
noted that the contract of exchange is more ancient than the contact 
of sale.230 While continental civil law recognizes the contract of 
sale, so does Islamic law, and the Tunisian code incorporates the 
concept of this contract in a way that permits it to comport with 
both legal traditions.  
Under Tunisian law, a contract of exchange is a contract by 
which each party gives to another, as property, a movable or 
immovable thing, or an intangible right, against another thing or 
 227. MEJELLE, Art. 394. 
 228. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 22 n.99. 
 229. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 576. 
 230. DEMANTE, supra note 93, at 189. 
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right of a similar or of a different nature.231 This comports with 
modern civil codes which retain this nominate contract and tend to 
define it as “a contract whereby each party transfers to the other 
the ownership of a thing other than money.”232 
Consistent with classical civil law, Tunisian law holds that a 
contract of exchange is perfected by the consent of the parties.233 
When, however, the contract of exchange regards buildings or 
other objects susceptible to mortgage, the provisions of the 
Tunisan code dealing with immoveable property are applicable234 
(namely the contract must be made in writing with a date that is 
certain and will have no effect vis-à-vis third parties unless it is 
registered in the registry of finance, subject to the special 
provisions relating to registered buildings).235 
When the exchanged objects are different of values, the parties 
are permitted to make up the difference through cash payments or 
other objects, at that time or as a future sale. This provision has no 
effect between Muslims when the exchanged objects are 
commodities.236 As with contracts of sale, this exception for 
Muslims relates to the Islamic rules relating to the sale of 
commodities and future contracts, which maintain very specific 
requirements which are occasionally at variance with the 
continental civil law rules.237  
H. Deposit and Sequestration 
A deposit is a contract by which a person surrenders a chattel 
to another person who undertakes to keep the deposited thing and 
 231. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 718. 
 232. See, e.g., LA CIV. CODE art. 2660. 
 233. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 719; DEMANTE, 
supra note 93, at 189: “Dans les principes de notre Droit français ce contrat est 
consensuel aussi bien que la vente.” 
 234. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 719. 
 235. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 581. 
 236. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 720. 
 237. ABU-MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH BIN ABI-ZAYD & ABDUR-RAHMAN AL-
QYRAWANI, supra note 212. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
42 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 7 
 
return it in its individuality.238 A contract of deposit must be made 
in writing if it is of a value exceeding one thousand dinars. This 
rule does not, however, apply to a necessary deposit which is 
defined as one that was forced by a fortuitous event or force 
majeure event, such as a fire, a shipwreck or another event, the 
proof of which may be made by any means, regardless of the value 
of the object of the deposit.239 
A person making or accepting a deposit must have the capacity 
to form obligations.240 If, however, a person able to bind himself 
accepts a deposit made by an incapable person, that person is 
bound by all obligations arising from the deposit.241 
The depositary is answerable for any foreseeable loss or 
damage to the thing when (a) he or she receives a salary for the 
custody of the deposit; and/or (b) when he or she receives deposits 
as a result of his or her status or according to his or her 
functions.242 The depositary is not answerable for loss or damage 
caused (a) by nature or problems with the thing deposited or by the 
negligence of the depositor; or (b) in cases of force majeure or 
fortuitous events, so long as the depositary has not been already 
put in default for failure to return the thing deposited, or so long as 
the force majeure is not the depositary’s fault or the fault of 
persons for which he is responsible.243 Proof of force majeure or 
defect of the things is the depositary’s burden, when the depositary 
receives a salary for the filing or when he received the thing by 
virtue of his status or pursuant to his functions.244 Otherwise, the 
depositary shall ensure the custody of the deposit, with the same 
diligence that one would apply to things that belong to him.245  
 238. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 995. 
 239. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1003. 
 240. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 998. 
 241. Id. 
 242. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1021. 
 243. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1022. 
 244. Id. 
 245. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1005. 
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Under Tunisian law, any agreement is void in which the 
depositary would be held responsible for fortuitous events or force 
majeure, except in certain circumstances, including those where 
the depositary receives a salary.246 This last provision only applies 
between non-Muslims.247 This exception for Muslims relates to 
Islamic law governing the delivery of things for safe-keeping, 
which generally hold a depositary liable for the destruction of the 
thing entrusted to him, except for cases of fortuitous events or 
force majeure. The Mejelle’s provisions on this topic, for instance, 
provide that “if the contract for delivery [for safekeeping] has been 
made for payment to be made for the safe keeping, in case it is 
destroyed or wasted by a cause which it is possible to guard 
against, it becomes a cause of compensation.”248 When, however, 
the loss is not something that could be guarded against, then the 
general rule applies that “if it be destroyed or wasted without any 
[fault] of the person who accepts it and without any fault in the 
keeping of it, it does not become necessary to make 
compensation.”249 In providing an exception to the civil law rule, 
the Tunisian code permits this Islamic rule to become operational 
between Muslims. 
I. Mandate  
Under Tunisian law, a mandate can be special or general.250 A 
special mandate is one that is given for one or more specified 
endeavors, or which confers only specific powers.251 It gives 
power to act in specified endeavors and matters necessarily 
attendant thereto, according to the nature of the matter.252 A 
general mandate, in contrast, is one which gives the mandatary the 
 246. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1023. 
 247. Id. 
 248. MEJELLE, Art. 777. 
 249. Id. 
 250. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1116. 
 251. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1117. 
 252. Id. 
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power to manage all the interests of the principal without limit, or 
which confers broad powers without limit in a particular case.253 It 
gives the power to do all that is in the interests of the principal, 
according to the nature of the case and the usage of trade, and 
especially to recover what is due, to pay debts, to carry out 
conservatory acts, to bring possessory actions, and even enter into 
obligations to the extent necessary to carry out the affairs for 
which the principal is responsible.254 
With regard to the sources of law used for the Tunisian rules on 
mandate, Belknani highlights article 1163 as an example of the 
integration of Islamic law into the Tunisian code.255 According to 
that article, the total or partial revocation of the mandate cannot 
have effect toward third parties of good faith who have contracted 
with the mandatary before the revocation, except for the principal’s 
recourse against the mandatary.256 When the law prescribes a 
determined form for the establishment of the mandate, the same 
form is required for revocation.257  
A review of the provisions of the Mejelle reveal similar 
provisions regarding vekyalet—a contract in which a person 
appoints another to conduct affairs on his or her behalf.258 Those 
provisions make clear that the excesses of the person so appointed 
(the vekyl) do not prejudice third parties but, instead, inure to the 
detriment of the vekyl.259  
J. Oaths (Les Serments) 
Another area where the gravitational pull of Islamic law and 
Tunisian custom is evident is in the rules governing oaths. 
Continental civil law recognizes, among other things, the use of 
 253. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1119. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 22 n.100. 
 256. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1163. 
 257. Id. 
 258. MEJELLE, Art. 1449. 
 259. E.g., MEJELLE, Arts. 1470-1471, 1479. 
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oaths as a manner of proving the existence of facts relevant to civil 
litigation. For instance, Article 1357 of the French Civil Code 
provides for the use of judicial oaths (le serment). This has been 
described as “a remnant of the formalistic medieval procedure” 
which is used less frequently today.260 There are three varieties of 
such judicial oaths in French civil law: the decisory oath (serment 
décisoire), the supplementary oath (serment supplétoire), and the 
serment in litem or serment in plaids which deals with damages.  
The first of these (the serment décisoire) is an oath 
administered by one party to the other, upon which the result of the 
action is made to depend.261 The serment supplétoire is the oath 
administered by the judge to one of the parties in order to 
determine an issue.262 The last variety (serment en plaids, or 
serment in litem) is a kind of oath in which, under certain 
exceptional circumstances, the judge may to administer to a 
plaintiff in order to determine the value of the thing forming the 
object of the action.263 
Tunisian law also recognizes two types of oaths for purposes of 
establishing facts in civil litigation: (1) one which a party refers to 
the other in order to make the case depend upon it (décisoire); and 
(2) one which is brought ex officio by the judges to one or the other 
of parties (supplétoire).264 Although a lengthy discussion of these 
devices is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that 
Tunisian civil law incorporates them, but also imbues them with a 
 260. See PETER EMILIUS HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 358 (1967). 
 261. OLIVER EATON BODINGTON, AN OUTLINE OF THE FRENCH LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 72-73 (1904). Writing in 1904, Oliver Eaton Bodington noted that 
“the serment décisoire, or oath administered by one party to the other, may be 
administered by any party who has proof to make in support of his demand, or 
of his plea in defence.” Importantly, such an oath can be made in a variety of 
judicial contests but can only be made in regard only to “things done by the 
person himself, or at the doing of which he was present.” Bodington also noted 
that French courts and commentators have universally held “that the oath can 
only be administered in regard to facts which are of a decisive character, that is 
to say, a character which shall determine the issue.” 
 262. Id. at 72-73. 
 263. Id. 
 264. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 492. 
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religious dimension that does not ordinarily exist in continental 
civil law. Specifically, Article 495 of the Tunisian code notes that 
“[t]he oath must always be taken in the mosque on Friday or in any 
other religious place which will be indicated by the party offering 
the oath and in conformance with the religious sect of the 
party.”265 If the place where the oath must be taken is further than 
three miles from the place where the Court sits, the part to which 
the oath is referred may refuse to go there. Notably, the party who 
refuses to be sworn in the indicated place is deemed to have 
refused the oath.266 Such provisions—requiring an oath to be taken 
“in the mosque on Friday or in any other religious place”—imbues 
this procedure with a religious element that gives recognition to the 
role of religion in civil affairs. 
K. Mouçakâte and Moughâraça 
The Tunisian code’s inclusion of the Islamic concepts of 
mouçakâte and moughâraça are also examples of how Islamic 
influences can sometimes become dominant traits within the codal 
text, especially in the code’s treatment of agricultural contracts.267 
With regard to the first of these, the Tunisian civil code 
incorporates the device of a mouçakâte defining it as a contract by 
which the owner of a crop which is ready for cultivation charges 
another person, referred to as a colon, to do the necessary work of 
picking or harvesting in exchange for a determined share of the 
harvest.268 This sort of arrangement is derived from the Islamic 
legal arrangement with the same name, also transliterated as 
musaqah or musāqāt, which is generally defined as a type of 
contract in which “an owner of trees or crops entrusts his trees or 
crops to a person to look after and water them until they bear fruit 
 265. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 495. 
 266. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 496. 
 267. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 23. 
 268. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1395. 
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or ripen [in exchange for] a specific portion of such fruit or 
crops.”269  
The Tunisian code also incorporates the device known as 
moughâraça, which it defines as a contract which forms an entity 
which has for its object the fruit trees or other crops with regard to 
which one of the parties, known as the colon, is responsible for 
their planting and care in exchange for an undivided share of the 
land and soil and the trees or crops.270 This is obviously derived 
from the Islamic property device of the same name—also 
transliterated as mugharisah or magharisah—which endows the 
lessee with real rights and is typically defined as “a contract by 
virtue of which an owner entrusts land to a person who undertakes 
to plant it with fruit trees [in exchange for] receiving a portion of 
the land.”271  
Professor Lisa Anderson provides some context for how such a 
contract would order society in rural North Africa: 
In both Tunisia and Libya, the Sahil was often home of a 
contract known as the magharisah, in which property was 
confided to a land-poor farmer for development; upon its 
harvest, he was to receive half the land as his own. This 
type of contract was particularly characteristic of the tree-
crop regions, where the first harvest of marketable produce 
was sometimes decades from planting. The magharsi—the 
developer—was tied to the landowner by numerous 
personal obligations. During the tenure of the contract, he 
was often obliged to ask for advances in money or in kind 
from the landowner, much of which he would not be able to 
return until the expiration of the agreement, and even then, 
he might find himself better served by a renewal of the 
contract than under the obligation to repay his debts.272 
Inclusion of such traditional Islamic legal devices demonstrates 
the way in which Santillana sought to directly instill certain aspects 
 269. See FARHAT J. ZIADEH, PROPERTY LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD 70-71 
(1979). 
 270. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1416. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Anderson, supra note 35, at 45. 
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of Islamic law into the Tunisian code and to preserve both a sense 
of tradition, historicity, and legal continuity in its text. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Tunisia is now emerging as a model for Arab Spring countries 
seeking a successful transition to democracy. Its recent success in 
completing its new, post-revolution constitution demonstrates its 
leading role in the region. As such, legal developments within 
Tunisia carry the potential for regional impact as other countries 
seek to emulate its successful transition.273 Political contention 
relating to the role of Islamic law in post-revolution Tunisia, 
however, will not cease simply because a new constitution is now 
in force.274 Rather, the issues of concern to Islamists in Tunisia and 
more secular Tunisians will continue to be debated in the corridors 
of Tunisia’s newly democratic institutions. 275 Understanding that 
debate as it relates to Tunisian law necessarily requires an 
understanding of the domestic law in force in Tunisia, its sources, 
and its compatibility with Islamic law.  
As this article has demonstrated, the fact that Tunisia’s new 
constitution contains no express reference to Islamic law does not 
mean that Islamic law plays no role in Tunisia.276 To the contrary, 
an analysis of Tunisian civil law demonstrates the historic and 
continuing presence of Islamic legal influence in Tunisian civil 
law. Importantly, this influence—which spans the history of 
modern Tunisia—has not been a negative aspect or a harmful 
element. Rather, the Tunisian code demonstrates how Islamic law 
can function in a modern context alongside continental civil law as 
part of a mixed jurisdiction in which domestic civil law is derived 
 273. See Woodruff, supra note 22. 
 274. See Ghribi, supra note 26.  
 275. See supra note 22; see also HAMOUDI, supra note 89, at 226: “Tunisia, 
for example, appears deeply split between a moderate Islamist movement that 
seeks a more enhanced role for Islam, and a strong secular movement 
significantly influenced by Tunisia’s recent past, which regards such aspirations 
with uncommon fear.” 
 276. See supra note 1. 
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from a multiplicity of sources,277 namely the French civil code,278 
the German civil code,279 several schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
(especially the Malikite and Hanafite schools),280 the Mejelle,281 
Tunisian custom, French jurisprudence, and the jurisprudence of 
French courts which were active in Tunisia during its time as a 
French protectorate.282 Equilibrium between continental civil law 
and Islamic law was achieved in that code through direct 
incorporation of Islamic law and Islamic legal devices into the 
codal text; exploiting the natural parallelisms that exist between 
Islamic law and continental civil law; excepting Muslims from 
aspects of the civil law which might violate the tenets of Islamic 
law; and through imparting a religious dimension to otherwise 
secular legal devices. The result is a codification of civil law which 
adheres to the modern civil law model inspired by the French civil 
code, but which is also uniquely Tunisian—and uniquely well-
suited to the task of ordering plurality in Tunisia in the aftermath 
of the Jasmine revolution.  
Understanding this aspect of Tunisian civil law informs our 
understanding of the ongoing debates surrounding the role of 
Islamic law in post-revolution Tunisia and the significance of 
constitutional references to Islamic law or the lack thereof. Islamic 
law has, to some extent, been a part of Tunisian civil law for over 
100 years and, because Islamic law is interwoven into the fiber of 
Tunisia’s foundational legal texts, it will continue to be part of 
Tunisian civil law under the aegis of the new constitution. As with 
other countries, however, its compatibility with Islamic law and its 
incorporation of traditional Tunisian legal devices in the context of 
a modern civil code has doubtlessly contributed to its institutional 
durability, and durable institutions of that nature will be needed to 
 277. See Donlan, supra note 31. 
 278. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 18. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. See Voorhoeve, supra note 51, at 54. 
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maintain stability in a region undergoing such dramatic social and 
political upheaval. As Béatrice Hibou noted in the preface to the 
English edition of her excellent work on Tunisia entitled The Force 
of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia: 
What is happening in Tunisia is important, over and above 
what this country in North Africa actually represents, with 
its small population, lacking any income derived from 
economy, energy sources or geopolitical clout, or any 
dominant position in the region. These days it benefits from 
the impact of the Tunisian ‘revolution’ on the rest of the 
region, in Egypt, of course, but also elsewhere in the Arab 
world and sub-Saharan Africa. But history has already 
shown how this ‘little country’ could serve as an 
example.283 
The fact that Tunisia’s mixed civil law system has persisted for 
over a century (and remains a celebrated facet of the country’s 
legal culture) provides reason for optimism as Tunisia moves 
forward in its transition to democracy. Moreover, other countries 
in the region may also benefit from the Tunisian experience—the 
example of this “little country” which has changed the 
physiognomy of the Middle East and North Africa at almost every 
level—as they look to develop civil laws which are modern, yet 
compatible with their legal traditions, customs, and Islamic legal 
precepts. As noted in this article, it would not be the first time that 
this small country on the Mediterranean coast illuminated a path 
for others to follow.  
 283. BÉATRICE HIBOU, THE FORCE OF OBEDIENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF REPRESSION IN TUNISIA xiii-xiv (2011). 
 
 
                                                                                                             
